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To date, in considering general warrants, courts have been failing even to think
about a distinction which ought to be seen as essential. The distinction arises in
connection with the requirement in section 487.01 (l)(c) of the Criminal Code
that a general warrant is only available when no other provision in any statute
could authorize the search. In /?. v. Ha, reported ante p. 24, the Ontario Court of
Appeal notes that:
The simple fact is that there is no provision in the Code, the CDSA, or in any
other federal statute that would authorize an unlimited number of covert entries and searches on private property over a two-month period.'

That is perfectly true. It is quite possible, however, that the reason it is true is
that Parliament has decided that there ought not to be a power to conduct "an
unlimited number of covert entries and searches on private property over a twomonth period". Courts have so far been failing even to consider the possibility
that the reason some of these powers do not exist is because Parliament has
decided that they should not exist.
The distinction which so far has not been given attention in the case law is between searches which are not authorized by any provision because they are of an
unanticipated type, and those which are not authorized by any provision because
they were anticipated and were deliberately ruled out. One would think, for example, that in setting minimum standards for physical searches of a place in
section 487 (standards which correspond to the constitutional minimum, according to Hunter v. Southam Inc.2), Parliament has stated quite clearly that physical
searches based on less justification than that contained in those standards are not
authorized. The question, is this type of search allowed? would not be an unanticipated question: it would be one that was anticipated and answered in the negative. To allow the general warrant provision to authorize both unanticipated and
deliberately excluded searches is to ignore a crucial distinction.
Think, for example, about the first reason offered by the police for obtaining the
general warrant in this case: to "[o]btain evidence that the chemicals purchased
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by Ha [the appellant] are present in one or more of the places set out in Appendix 'A' of the Information".-^ That ground is not found in isolation in this case,
but for clarity's sake let us consider it as though it had been the only ground for
the moment. Section 487, the search warrant provision, is quite clear that to
obtain a search warrant the police must already be able to show that "there are
reasonable grounds to believe that there is in a building, receptacle or
place.. .any offence-related property", that is, property that is intended for use
for the purpose of committing an indictable offence. In other words, the police
would not be able to obtain a search warrant in order to find out whether something is in a location, because that is one of the preconditions for obtaining a
search warrant. Authorizing such a search, therefore, would amount to finding
that the very failure to satisfy the conditions for obtaining a search warrant
makes the general warrant available. Put another way, case law under section
487 amounts to saying "you cannot conduct fishing expeditions". A broad approach to section 487.01 turns that into "if fishing expeditions are not available
under section 487, that must mean they are available under section 487.01".
Surely not.4
The Court of Appeal does deal here with the claim that this particular warrant
authorized a fishing expedition, but more could be said on the subject than they
say. In part, their answer is that the warrant was not only issued for that purpose,
but actually served other goals: a reasonable point and one pursued further below. The court's main response, however, is to reject the suggestion that this
search was a fishing expedition: the police, the court says, did in fact already
have reasonable grounds to believe that the chemicals were on the premises (despite what the wording of the Information to Obtain suggests, one might note).
That is very likely right, but it should not end the analysis. Justice MacPherson
for the court notes parenthetically, "in my view, there is no type of warrant that
should authorize an investigation that is truly a 'fishing expedition'".5 The difficulty is that nothing in the approach to section 487.01 in this case or any previous one creates an analytical framework which would exclude such searches.
The court does say that "the question of the merits of an authorization remains a
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a different, but very real, example, consider /?. v. Noseworthy (1997), 33 O.K. (3d)
641 (Ont. C.A.), relied on here by the court as authority for concluding that "any thing"
in section 487.01 is not limited to "a thing like a device or investigative technique or
procedure", but is in fact open-ended. In Noseworthy the police had used section 487.01
to obtain an anticipatory search warrant, and this was justified in part on the basis that
ordinary search warrants were not available on an anticipatory basis. One would think
serious consideration of whether not providing for anticipatory search warrants had been
a deliberate policy choice on Parliament's part would have been in order.
- para. 49.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133478

live and important one"6 which can be addressed in deciding whether the search
is in the best interests of the administration of justice, a question raised by section 487.01(l)(b). This is one possible place to start thinking about the distinction I have proposed.
Of course, sometimes a method of search will be perfectly reasonable, but the
mechanism for conducting that search will not be a breathalyser or a blood test
or a body impression or a wiretap or a dial number recorder or some other
method which has been specifically authorized. In such cases it is entirely sensible that some method of authorizing such searches should be available. This
might sometimes also be true even if the search does not depend on some particular new piece of technology. In this case, as the Court of Appeal notes, there
were other reasons to conduct the search beyond finding out whether evidence
was on the premises, such as to identify the accused's accomplices. In R. v.
Brand,1 a general warrant was allowed to conduct surveillance on a property
where police already had enough evidence to obtain a search warrant to seize the
drugs they knew to be there, because the surveillance would be useful in determining the best way to execute search warrants eventually, and would help produce evidence of the broader conspiracy. Some types of search powers are simply unanticipated as opposed to anticipated but excluded, and so an
interpretation of section 487 which is not limited to new technological advances
is possibly justified. That still ought not to mean that all other techniques are
permitted.
On any interpretation of section 487.01 which expands it beyond the analogy to
technological means, two further issues arise. First, taking section 487.01 to be
limited not only to new technologies, but also to include any investigative behaviour infringing on a reasonable expectation of privacy (as the Court of Appeal
does here, and as other courts have done) means that it falls to the courts to
decide, on a case- by-case basis, what powers the police have. As the court here
notes:
the determination of whether the police will be allowed to use a specific investigative means (not involving interference with bodily integrity) in any
given case will be decided by balancing the state interest in law enforcement
and the individual interest in privacy.8

It will at least be the case that the decision will be made by a judge, and will be
made in advance of the search, which is preferable to the creation of a common
law power after the fact. Even so, the powers will be created on an ad hoc basis:
one judge will allow things that another will not. In addition, the only parties
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making representations to the judge will be those seeking to infringe on privacy,
not those seeking to protect it. An ex pane hearing as to whether the conditions
for using a predetermined power have been made out is one thing: an ex. pane
hearing, with only the police being heard on the question of whether a new police power should exist, is quite another. That ad hoc and unbalanced approach
to police powers becomes difficult to reconcile with the rule of law. Comments
made by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ferguson? seem equally apt in
this context:
[68] The principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law lie at the root of
democratic governance: Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217. It is fundamental to the rule of law that "the law must be accessible and
so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable": Lord Bingham, "The
Rule of Law" (2007), 66 Cambridge L.J. 67, at p. 69. Generality, promulgation, and clarity are among the essential elements of the "morality that makes
law possible": L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd ed. 1969), at pp. 33-39.

[72] The divergence between the law on the books and the law as applied —
and the uncertainty and unpredictability that result — exacts a price paid in
the coin of injustice. First, it impairs the right of citizens to know what the
law is in advance and govern their conduct accordingly — a fundamental
tenet of the rule of law. ...

"Generality, promulgation, and clarity" are essential, the Court says. Police
powers under the current approach to section 487.01 are specific, unpromulgated, and have entirely unclear limits. This suggests a different approach to
general warrants would be in order.
The final point is to observe the logical consequence of not adopting a different
approach, but rather of continuing along the path of concluding that section
487.01 "speaks to any situation in which the police seek judicial authority to do
something that, absent that authority, would constitute a breach of s. 8 of the
Charter".1® On that assumption, it must also become relevant that the police
have failed to seek judicial authorization when they could have sought it. The
law has been quite clear since Hunter v. Southam Inc. that warrantless searches
are prima facie unreasonable: that is, a violation of section 8 of the Charter. In
addition, the Court has observed on many occasions that the failure to obtain a
warrant where it would have been possible to do so renders a violation more
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serious." The approach to section 487.01 here means that it would be possible
in principle for police to seek a general warrant, rather than simply proceed
without authorization, in any number of situations: before using a drug-sniffing
dog, to cite one obvious example.
Similarly, particularly when considering whether new common law police powers ought to be created, courts often make reference to the "absence of Parliamentary action" or the "absence of statutory authority".12 To the extent that such
absence is often taken as a partial justification for creating a common law
power, the courts' reasoning is incomplete. Given the interpretation of section
487.01 used here (and in virtually all cases), there is no absence of Parliamentary action. In fact, every possible search (and for that matter a significant number of detentions which would infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy)
has been legislated about. The fact that a court might want a standard other than
that set out in section 487.01 is quite a different issue from the suggestion that
no statutory regime exists at all.
If general warrants truly are available to authorize the police to "do any thing" in
an open-ended way, then the failure of the police to seek such warrants when
doing anything which infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy ought
also to be taken into account in a variety of other contexts. That too is something
which has so far been absent from the courts' analyses.

1 'See, for example, R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, 10 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kokesch,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 3, 1 C.R. (4th) 62 (S.C.C.); or R. v. Collins, [1987] I S.C.R. 265, 56 C.R.
(3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
12See the judgments of Justice Binnie in R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, 47 C.R. (6th) 219
(S.C.C.), at para. 76, and of Justice LeBel in R. v. Brown, 2008 SCC 18, 55 C.R. (6th)
240 (S.C.C.), at para. 13, for example.

